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Solid Wastes from Nuclear Power
Production
by Harvey F. Soule*
Radioactivity in nuclear powereffluents is negligible compared to that in retained wastes to be disposed
of as solids. Two basic waste categories are those for which shallow disposal is accepted and those for
which more extreme isolation is desired. The latter includes "high level" wastes and others contaminated
with radionuclides with the unusual combined properties of long radioactive half-life and high specific
radiotoxicity. The favored method for extreme isolation is emplacement in a deep stable geologic forma-
tion. Necessary technologies for waste treatment and disposal are considered available. The present
program to implement these technologies is discussed, including the waste management significance of
current policy on spent nuclear fuel reprocessing. Recent diffculties with shallow disposal of waste are
summarized.
Introduction
The United States Department of Energy
(USDOE) is concerned with the development and
use ofmultiple energy sources to meet our needs in
an occupationally and environmentally safe man-
ner, and we believe the decisions involved in these
energy matters cannot be made sensibly without an
across-the-board look at potential hazards.
The Nuclear Power Fuel Cycle
The generation ofnuclear electric power involves
a number of supporting or related activities at sites
otherthan the nuclear reactoritself. These activities
are generally called the nuclear fuel cycle. For the
type of power reactor predominant in the United
States today, the steps in the front end ofthe cycle
are the mining and milling of uranium ore; enrich-
ment in the uranium-235 content by the gaseous
diffusion process, with chemical conversions before
and after; and fabrication of the enriched uranium
into fuel elements. Under normal reactor operating
conditions, the fuel elements at time ofremoval still
contain a significant inventory of unfissioned ma-
terial, consisting of some of the original uranium-
235 and some ofthe plutonium-239 which has been
formed within the fuel by neutron capture in
uranium-238.
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Nuclear engineers and economists have fre-
quently assumed that eventually partly spent nu-
clear fuel would be processed chemically to sepa-
rate the residual fissionable material from the
radioactive fission products, which are very much
larger in quantity than would be required for any
known or projected beneficial uses of them. The
separated, purified fissionable materials would then
be blended with fresh material in new fuel elements
for reactor use, thus recovering some ofthe poten-
tial energy not extracted in the original reactor ir-
radiation. The establishment of these activities is
generally referred to as closing the fuel cycle. The
entire cycle is shown in Figure 1.
Historically, nuclear weapons preceded nuclear
power and the necessary materials have generally
been produced and processed independently. How-
ever, in recent years, especially in the United
States, there has been increasing concern that
plutonium-239 could be diverted from a nuclear
power fuel cycle into the development of nuclear
weapons. In April 1977, a Presidential policy was
announced containing two major parts: first, the
United States would indefinitely defer the recycling
of plutonium in the commercial nuclear fuel cycle;
second, the United States would redirect fuel cycle
research and development efforts toward new fuel
cycles or toward new processing methods within
the present cycle which would be more acceptable
from an antiproliferation viewpoint. An example
would be the blending of recovered uranium and
plutonium at the spent fuel processing plant, so that
283FIGURE 1. Commercial nuclear fuel cycle and types of waste
generated: (E) releasable in effluents; (HL) high level rad
waste; (LL) low level rad waste; (T) mill tailings; (TRU)
transuranium contaminated rad waste.
diversion ofplutonium from the next transportation
step would be less attractive to the would-be
weapons-maker. In the United States today, there-
fore, the closing ofthe back end ofthe fuel cycle is
in what may be an extended "holding pattern," and
the effects of this on the waste management pro-
gram will be touched on later.
Types of Nuclear Power Solid
Waste
The first major point to be made about solid
radioactive waste as a category is that it includes
essentially all the radioactivity in all radioactive
wastes, at least at times of final disposal. The first
reason for this is that the technology for removing
radioactivity from air and water effluents from nu-
clear power reactors and other large nuclear
facilities is well developed. This technology is de-
veloped to such a point that radiation exposures at
the proverbial fencepost due to the traces ofactivity
released are quite small relative to the variations
from state to state in natural background radiation.
On a near-time basis, it is true that a good deal of
the retained radioactivity is in liquid wastes, espe-
cially at the spent fuel processing plant. It is also
true that there are theoretically possible concepts
for the permanent disposal of radioactive liquid
waste. However, transportation safety restrictions
on liquid radioactive materials would make intersite
movement of liquid wastes economically prohibi-
tive, so that their solidification is a practical re-
quirement. Finally, from afinal disposal standpoint,
therefore, "solid radioactive wastes" and "radio-
RU active wastes' become almost interchangeable RU terms.
On considering solid radioactive wastes from this
permanent disposal standpoint, two broad cate-
gories are evident. One is solid waste for which
there is a consensus of approval for disposal either
by shallow burial, at locations carefully selected to
minimize erosion and leaching, or by sea dumping
at locations carefully selected to minimize effects of
dispersion from the sea bottom. (Because the
United States sea dumping regulations are so much
more restrictive than those recommended by the
International Atomic Energy Agency, the practice
is effectively prohibited for United States prospec-
tive users and thus will not be discussed further in
this presentation.) The other broad category is solid
waste for which shallow burial or sea dumping is
considered to provide insufficient isolation, or to
require too much surveillance or too extended sur-
veillance.
More isolated disposal has generally been pro-
posed for high-level wastes (either in the form of
discarded fuel, or the concentrated wastes that
would be prepared from processing the fuel) and for
other wastes contaminated with significant concen-
trations ofthe relatively small number ofradionuc-
lides which have the combined properties of long
radioactive half-life and high radiotoxicity per unit
weight. The primary natural example ofthis unusual
combination is radium-226. Most of the man-made
cases fall in the group known collectively as trans-
uranium nuclides, the most highly publicized one
being plutonium-239. The reasons for the presumed
high specific radiotoxicity of these materials are
unfavorable metabolic retention, and decay by a
particle emission rather than ,8 particle emission.
The subcategory of radioactive wastes assumed
to go to deepgeological isolation needs to be broken
down still further, for facility design purposes, be-
cause of differences in handling needs. High-level
waste will need massive shielding and remote han-
dling because of the penetrating radiation from the
large quantities offission products. There will also
need to be provision for either active or passive
cooling to remove the heat generated by the
radioactive decay of these same fission products,
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make the waste containers attractive for temporary
use as heat sources. Bits of fuel element cladding
(called hulls) will need highly remote handling be-
cause ofpenetrating radiation, but will probably not
need heat removal. Various solid wastes from spent
fuel processing plants (other than high-level) and
from fuel fabrication plants (with plutonium recy-
cle) may need semiremote handling, depending
upon the degree of fission product contamination
and the presence ofplutonium nuclides higher than
Pu-239. On a very long-term basis, all ofthe above
are transuranium waste.
Figure 1 shows the subcategories of radioactive
waste generated in the different steps ofthe nuclear
fuel cycle. Table 1, derived from a generic environ-
mental impact statement on commercial radioactive
waste management now in preparation (1), shows
volumes of some important types of waste relative
to one year's operation of a typical large power
reactor, and their radioactivity content. The con-
centration ofactivity in the relatively small volume
ofhigh-level waste is evident. The small volume of
this high-level waste, relative to the value of the
electrical energy, means that even if the disposal
facilities appear to be quite expensive, the costs are
still small compared to total nuclear fuel cycle
costs.
Availability of Technology for
Waste Management
Probably the most comprehensive document on
availability of technologies for radioactive waste
management is ERDA 76-43. This report (2) was
issued in May 1976 and has since been used as a
basic resource for a generic environmental state-
ment on the same subject. The key conclusions of
ERDA 76-43 are as follows:
". . . all technologies needed to manage radioactive
wastes from the back end ofthe commercial LWR fuel
cycle are commercialized, available, or under de-
velopment; there are no gaps.... Technologies for
managing wastes from LWR reactors are fully com-
mercialized. Technologies for treatment, interim stor-
age, and transportation ofwastes from fuel cycle oper-
ations such as fuel processing are commercialized, or
ready for commercial-scale design and proof-testing,
or can readily be implemented by adaptation of com-
mercial practice for management of nonradioactive
wastes.... The available technologies for final dispo-
sition of wastes are burial grounds and provisional
storage in deep continentalgeologic formations. Stable
geologies expected to be suitable for deep geologic
isolation are known, technologies for site exploration
and site selection are available, and design principles
for waste repositories are known. Repository designs
and qualification procedures will be specific to the site
being considered; they can be developed as necessary
when candidate sites are identified."
Implementing Geologic Isolation
Technology
Permanent disposal of high-level radioactive
waste in geologic formations has been advocated for
a number of years to preclude burdening future gen-
erations with close surveillance and periodic re-
placement of man-made storage systems, such as
tanks or vaults. The general rationale for geologic
disposal is as follows: if we find a formation which
has been stable for geologically long periods of
time; if no water is flowing through the formation; if
we can excavate a cavity without harming the integ-
rity ofthe formation; if we can place our potentially
hazardous wastes within the cavity in chemical and
physical forms which will not significantly react
with the formation; and if we can then withdraw,
carefully sealing all man-made openings, we should
have reasonable assurance that our hazardous
wastes will remain isolated from man's environment
forgeologically long periods oftime into the future.
Over a number of years, the research and de-
velopment effort of the old United States Atomic
Energy Commission (USAEC) was directed toward
Table 1. Projected solid radioactive wastes based on one GW-year operation.
Activity, Ci (TBg)
Activation Fission
Type Weight, MT (Tg) Vol,m3 products products Actinides
Reactor trash 600 1.9 x 105 (7000) 4.0 X 103 (148)
Spent fuela 38.2 (34.6) 8.2 x 106 (300,000) 1.3 x 108 (4,800,000) 5.0 x 10r (185,000)
Reprocessing plant
Transuranium trash 110 47 (2) 7.9 x 102 (29) 1.8 x 104 (670)
High-level 2.2 5.3 x 107 (2,000,000) 5.3 x 105 (20,000)
Hulls 12.3 3.6 x 105 (13,000) 2.7 x 104 (1,000) 3.8 x 104 (1,400)
Non-TRU trash 50 1.7 (0.06) 8.4 (0.31)
Fuel refabrication plant 11 5.3 x 103 (196)
Decontamination and decommissioning 6 0.06 (0.002) 1.5 (0.056)
a If spent fuel is discarded as a waste, the reprocessing plant wastes and the fuel fabrication transuranium wastes will not exist.
December 1978 285the geologic isolation of prospective nuclear power
fuel cycle high-level waste in bedded salt. In 1970, a
specific closed-down salt mine at Lyons, Kansas,
was tentatively selected, subject to the satisfactory
completion of certain additional tests and studies.
By mid-1972, it had become obvious that questions
as to the integrity of this specific underground site
might not be resolved favorably and soon enough.
One of these questions involved locating and plug-
ging nearby oil and gas exploration wells possibly
dating back to the early 1900's; the other involved
the nearby mining ofsalt by hydraulic methods with
reported losses of large quantities of water under-
ground. Dropping work on Lyons was a technical
setback, and because the original tentative nature of
the site selection had been largely ignored in the
press, it was even more of a public acceptance set-
back. There were even news stories to the effect
that we had been forced to remove radioactive
waste from the mine, which was not so. The only
radioactive materials ever placed in the Lyons mine
were some irradiated fuel elements, which had been
used to simulate solidified high-level waste canis-
ters and completely removed at the end of an 18-
month test period some years previously.
For several years after dropping work on Lyons,
the AEC carried on a two-part program. One part
was a search for one or more sites to replace Lyons,
and the other part was to develop a repository at
which commercial high-level waste could be stored
in a readily retrievable manner pending the availa-
bility of a final disposal site. A main reason for this
second part ofthe program was to be sure ofmeet-
ing a commitment for the Federal Government to
accept custody ofhigh-level waste no later than ten
years after its generation by the commercial spent
fuel processor.
During the period of 1972 through 1974, consider-
able engineering effort was devoted to developing
several design concepts for readily retrievable stor-
age of high-level waste. However, a number of en-
vironmentally oriented groups, including the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA),
feared that AEC's interest in waste storage indi-
cated an inability or lack of desire to go onward to
permanent disposal. In January 1975, the operating
functions of the AEC were transferred by act of
Congress to a new agency, the United States
Energy Research and Development Administration
(USERDA), which then made a comprehensive re-
view ofwaste management and other inherited pro-
grams.
As a result of this review, the proposed waste
management budget submitted to Congress in
January 1976 included a drastic increase in the
geological disposal effort. In addition to having
large areas of land underlain by bedded salt or
domed salt, the United States is also fortunate to
have large areas of argillaceous rock (certain clays
and shales). All three types of rock are considered
by geologists to be potentially satisfactory for
geologic disposal. The expanded program called for
studies of available data, core drilling in promising
areas, and possibly underground inspection of the
best areas shown by the core drilling, all leading to
identification of about six regional sites at which
repositories could be constructed during the 1985-
1995 period.
As stated previously, it now appears that U. S.
spent nuclear fuel will be stored, possibly for an
extended period, pending a final decision on
whether to process it or discard it. Under this con-
dition, the need for as many as six repositories over
the next decade or so is not as clear as when the
program was expanded. The need to demonstrate
permanent disposal to environmentally oriented
groups, however, is still urgent. Therefore, the
present policy ofDOE (which absorbed ERDA and
certain other agencies on October 1, 1977) is to con-
centrate the geologic search for commercial waste
repositories on salt, with a target ofidentifying two
sites by late 1978 or early 1979 which could lead to
1985 repositories.
Continuing work in formations otherthan salt will
be concentrated on the existing DOE reservations
(former AEC sites) at Hanford and Nevada. These
sites have underground formations ofshale, granite,
or basalt which could be suitable for permanent dis-
posal of commercial waste; for permanent disposal
of waste from the nuclear weapons program; or for
extended retrievable storage of spent fuel. The
evaluations of these reservations are to be acceler-
ated so thatjudgment on their uses can be made in
about two years.
One feature of our geologic disposal program
which has not varied over the past few years is the
concept of the test period. In this concept, at the
beginning ofrepository operations the waste (either
high-level or transuranium-contaminated) would be
placed within the formation in some type of fitting
or lining so that if necessary it could be readily re-
trieved without leaving contamination behind. This
removal capability would be maintained during a
test period, in which studies could be made with a
significant inventory ofactual waste in place. Prob-
ably the most important study would be to confirm
the theoretical and laboratory work on the safe dis-
sipation of radioactive decay heat. Only on suc-
cessful completion of the test period would the re-
trievable mode be abandoned and the waste consid-
ered permanently emplaced. The test period con-
cept is also under consideration for the high-level
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waste program in the Federal Republic ofGermany
(FRG), which has done a great deal ofwork in salt.
The FRG and the United States are in close cooper-
ation in the two programs.
Figure 2 (which is greatly compressed vertically)
shows schematically how the high-level waste por-
tion ofa geologic disposal repository would operate
during the test period. If necessary, the material
would be removed by reversing the emplacement
procedure. Fuel cladding, or "hulls" would proba-
bly be handled similarly since they would need to be
lowered into the floor to provide shielding. Because
ofthe need to keep the tunnels clear for movement
of the transporter, the transuranium-contaminated
waste packages would have to be placed in separate
rooms or tunnels. However, since most of them
would not need to be shielded, they could be closely
stacked as in a warehouse.
In addition to mentioning these broad plans and
features of the geologic disposal program, some
specific highlights of the past year should be men-
tioned.
Reconnaissance ofinterior GulfCoast salt domes
in the State of Louisiana was conducted by
Louisiana State University, the United States
Geological Survey (USGS) and other contractors
and consultants by use of remote sensing tech-
niques (satellite imagery), seismic and tectonic field
surveys, aerial photogrammetric and gravity sur-
veys, groundwater studies, compilation of strati-
graphic data from existing boreholes, etc. Based on
this work, several domes have been selected for
further study, and a Geologic Project Manager, Law
Engineering Testing Company ofMarietta, Georgia,
has been selected to manage these activities.
Reconnaissance (paper studies) surveys of por-
tions of the Salina Salt Basin underlying Michigan,
Ohio, and New York have been completed. Stone
and Webster has been selected as Geologic Project
Manager to conduct the subsequent area studies.
Reconnaissance surveys of the Mississippi and
Texas Interior salt domes and of the Permian
bedded salt deposits in the Texas panhandle are in
progress, the latter in collaboration with the Texas
Bureau of Economic Geology.
We have begun accelerated work in investigating
potential sites at the NuclearTest Station in Nevada
and Hanford Reservation in Washington. Hanford
is underlain with deep strata ofbasalt which may be
suitable for a repository. Several geologic test holes
have been drilled and a vigorous program is planned
in the coming year.
An extensive borehole plugging program is in
progress. This includes a comprehensive cement
technology program aimed at developing satisfac-
tory plug materials (concrete) and criteria for
long-term sealing. A program to perform an in situ
demonstration ofplug emplacement techniques and
December 1978 287to develop instrumentation for monitoring the ef-
fectiveness ofthe plug to function as aborehole seal
has begun.
A cooperative program has been initiated with
Sweden, designed to conduct in situ heater tests at
the Stripa mine which will provide thermal property
information necessary to evaluate the feasibility of
crystalline rocks (granite) to function as the host
formation for high heat generating nuclear wastes.
An important part of the deep geologic disposal
program is the technology for the treatment of the
waste prior to its emplacement. The first United
States salt mine concept called for the high-level
waste to be disposed of in liquid form; however,
transportation safety restrictions on liquid radioac-
tive materials would have made this quite impracti-
cal except for a processing plant directly above a
salt formation. (The use of unlined man-made
caverns in geologic formations for storage of
flammable and hazardous fluids is common in the
United States chemical and oil industries.)
Solidification research and development was,
therefore, started early -in the program. One tech-
nique, which produces a dry oxide powder (calcine)
has been routinely used for about 12 years to solid-
ify high-level liquid wastes at one of the Govern-
ment sites. Other techniques producing ceramic or
glass-like solid forms have been developed through
the pilot plant or "'hot cell" stage, and this work is
continuing.
Some people have objected to calcine as a form
for permanent disposal of high-level waste, prefer-
ring a more insoluble and monolithic form, such as
borosilicate glass. However, our view is that physi-
cal and chemical form is primarily important rela-
tive to accidental dispersion ofmaterials inthe early
years when the waste is in a retrievable mode,
either for transportation or storage. Over the much
longer period of time involved in permanent dis-
posal, the geologic formation itself must be consid-
ered as the safety barrier. Figure 3 is an attempt to
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FIGURE 3. Barriers to the environment.
show this graphically.
Research and development is also continuing on
treatment of transuranium-contaminated solid
waste, focusing on incineration. This would have an
economic advantage (volume reduction) and a
safety advantage (preventing any subsequent acci-
dental fires in combustible waste).
Burial Grounds
The technology for shallow land burial of "low-
level" radioactive wastes is relatively simple. The
physical and chemical form ofthe waste is notrelied
on (except forthe requirement that it be solid rather
than liquid), with the soil itselfbeing considered the
safety barrier. At present, DOE has no operating or
regulatory responsibilities for the shallow burial of
commercial radioactive wastes, but is interested in
them because of similarities to its own operations.
There are now six United States commercial solid
radioactive waste burial grounds, all on land leased
from state Governments, with the state responsible
for surveillance afterthe burialground is filled. This
surveillance is financed by a small surcharge on the
operator's burial fee. There is presently consider-
able interest in the significance oftraces ofradioac-
tivity found in groundwater near two ofthese burial
grounds. The position taken by the public health
authorities in the two states involved (New York
and Kentucky) in each case is that the levels of
radioactivity which have been detected are not of
any public health significance, but that the situation
should be watched.
In both ofthese cases, the problem seems to have
come from mismanagement of surface waters (rain
or snow-melt), which were allowed to collect in
open waste trenches and then pumped out. This is
much easier to correct than an error in predictions
about subsurface waters coming into contact with
the wastes after completion of burial.
Over the past several years, a number of studies
have been made on the Government burialgrounds,
or are continuing, involving reevaluation of the
original site selection; engineering methods for cor-
rection of undesirable conditions that might be de-
tected; or criteria for site selection for possible new
burial grounds. The results of these studies are
being made available to commercial burial grounds'
operators and regulators as soon as they are
finished.
Uranium Mill Tailings
Ofall types ofsolid radioactive waste, the largest
by volume is the uranium mill tailings piles. United
States uranium-bearing ores are generally low grade
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so that the milling residues are almost the weight of
the original ore removed from the mine, and be-
cause ofthe crushing and grinding process are actu-
ally bulkier. The residues (tailings) also contain al-
most all ofthe daughter products ofuranium decay,
ofwhich radium-226 and its gaseous decay product,
radon-222, are the most publicized.
Experience at the uranium mill has shown that
tailings piles are not an environmental problem if
they are kept wet to prevent wind erosion and prop-
erly diked to prevent water run-off. Radon, even
from large piles, is notnoticeable above background
beyond - 0.8 km. (Radon is a noticeable compo-
nent ofworldwide natural radiation background due
to traces ofradium in virtually all kinds ofrocks and
soils.) However, if the tailings are used as con-
struction fill beneath or around structures used for
human occupancy, radon levels to which people are
exposed within those structures can approach the
levels found in a ventilated underground uranium
mine. Such construction use of tailings was com-
mon in one U. S. community (Grand Junction, Col-
orado) from the early 1950's until 1966, but has been
prohibited by Colorado regulations since then. For
the past several years, removal oftailings from be-
neath some of the Grand Junction buildings has
been done with Federal and state funding.
Decontamination and Decommis-
sioning
The decontamination and decommissioning of
surplus nuclear power reactors and other large fuel
cycle facilities has one special potential waste man-
agement aspect. This is not in the nature of the
radioactivity, since it is unlikely that the spectrum
ofradionuclides in decommissioning wastes will be
different (except for decay) than in the wastes dur-
ing the operating years. It is also not a matter of
waste volumes, although remote handling technol-
ogy may need to be adapted to the breaking down of
massive pieces of equipment into shippable-sized
packages. However, if the decision is made to en-
tomb the facility, we have a new radioactive waste
site, and the criteria for other kinds of permanent
waste disposal sites may not be fully applicable to
passingjudgment on this decision.
It is not presently clear what the long-term reg-
ulatory policy will be on the proliferation of en-
tombed nuclear facilities. If the eventual trend is
against them, economics will probably dictate that a
much higher priority be given at design time to fea-
tures which will make the later clean-up and disas-
sembly of the facility much easier than they are
now.
Conclusion and Summary
Despite a number of major changes in the direc-
tion ofthe national nuclear policy, the goal ofearly
location and construction of geologic repositories
for the permanent disposal of radioactive wastes
remains unchanged. Suchfacilities, designed for the
permanent isolation ofvitrified wastes, should also
be suitable for the retrievable storage of unrepro-
cessed fuel.
The present program will focus our activities in
regions where repositories can be available in the
mid-1980's, namely promising salt formations, and
on existing reservations where location of re-
positories in land already dedicated to handling nu-
clear materials would be politically and technically
preferred. We will concentrate on identifying real
technical alternatives for both geologic and surface
storage facilities which could be selected from in
about two years time for operation in the mid-
1980's.
We currently enjoy strong Congressional backing
as indicated by a growing budget to meet an ex-
panding program. We intend, however, to improve
our relationships with state and local Government
officials to involve them in the decision-making
process and to improve public acceptance for the
siting ofgeologic facilities.
We are currently faced with large quantities of
existing radioactive waste and we must face up to
the issue and provide permanent disposal of these
wastes with minimal requirements for future care
and surveillance. The future use of nuclear power
depends upon a successful implementation of this
program, and the time to act is now.
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